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- The European Economy
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The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
Barry Eichengreen
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Similar Items:
- The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline
- The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century
- Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction
- Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity
- The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters
ASIN: 0691127107 |
Book Description
In 1945, many Europeans still heated with coal, cooled their food with ice, and lacked indoor plumbing. Today, things could hardly be more different. Over the second half of the twentieth century, the average European's buying power tripled, while working hours fell by a third. The European Economy since 1945 is a broad, accessible, forthright account of the extraordinary development of Europe's economy since the end of World War II. Barry Eichengreen argues that the continent's history has been critical to its economic performance, and that it will continue to be so going forward.
Challenging standard views that basic economic forces were behind postwar Europe's success, Eichengreen shows how Western Europe in particular inherited a set of institutions singularly well suited to the economic circumstances that reigned for almost three decades. Economic growth was facilitated by solidarity-centered trade unions, cohesive employers' associations, and growth-minded governments--all legacies of Europe's earlier history. For example, these institutions worked together to mobilize savings, finance investment, and stabilize wages.
However, this inheritance of economic and social institutions that was the solution until around 1973--when Europe had to switch from growth based on brute-force investment and the acquisition of known technologies to growth based on increased efficiency and innovation--then became the problem.
Thus, the key questions for the future are whether Europe and its constituent nations can now adapt their institutions to the needs of a globalized knowledge economy, and whether in doing so, the continent's distinctive history will be an obstacle or an asset.
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History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
Anatoly Fomenko
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Similar Items:
- History: Fiction or Science? Chronology 2 (Chronology)
- Discovering the Mysteries of Ancient America: Lost History And Legends, Unearthed And Explored
- Before the Pharaohs: Egypt's Mysterious Prehistory
- Forbidden History: Prehistoric Technologies, Extraterrestrial Intervention, and the Suppressed Origins of Civilization
- They Cast No Shadows: A Collection of Essays on the Illuminati, Revisionist History, and Suppressed Technologies
ASIN: 2913621058 |
Book Description
Recorded history is a finely-woven magic fabric of intricate lies about events predating the sixteenth century. There is not a single piece of evidence that can be reliably and independently traced back earlier than the eleventh century. This book details events that are substantiated by hard facts and logic, and validated by new astronomical research and statistical analysis of ancient sources.
Customer Reviews:
Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed. .......2007-04-09
There is no doubt that history as most know it is a sham, & institution's version of History both University & Church is fradulent & inaccurate. Everything was established with an agenda, The real "Dark Ages" are now when we have access to incredible amounts of information past authorities & more important 'common folk' didn't have but our institutions & educators are slow to evolve because of what has ignorantly & arrogantly been taught for too long. This is on many subjects not just Chronology.
For anyone to question "Why would a Mathematician have anything credible to say of History?" The answer is from Dr. Fomenko's preface in the book: "It would be worthwhile to remind the reader that in the XVI-XVII century Chronology was considered to be a subdivision of Mathematics." These volumes could possibly be some of the most important works to date & should be read by everyone with an interest in History, especially professors & educators who have a duty to the public. I have read both books & must say that 'Chronology 1' has some very eye opening & revolutionary information. Even if these volumes are part true the implications are profound & opens the doors to further investigations & questions which must be done. I speak several different lanquages & must say the logic Dr. Fomenko uses with "inflection" of words & words being read from left to right in one region & right to left in another then written backwards, the removal of vowels & get down to basics of words, or different cities & locations having the same name etc. is correct. Vowel usage has always been optional & varied, actually complicating linquistics & study. The first thing one has to understand is that words never had a fixed spelling in history like we do now, the spelling of words was mutable & regional, as well as names & titles of people were vast, varied & changed, NOTHING WAS FIXED or understood linear. Matters of Life & Death as well as financial profiteering yesterday & today were & are made with ignorant, illogical & conspiratorial views of history & reality, it's time people get closer to the Truth & society collectively grow up.
Very Interesting.......2007-03-07
It is a good proposal and I believe it will mature into something even better in the future. I think it deserves to be read.
History as Science Fiction.......2007-01-10
Anatoly Fomenko has written a very intriguing book, full of pictures, charts, and computer 'proof' of his thesis: backwards of AD900 we don't really know what happened or when. Between AD900 and AD1600 there is more certainty, but there is still a lot of fuzzy ground, and things don't get reliable until we get past the 1600's where the printing press made it very difficult for the perpetrators of this timeline manipulation to change anything that had been committed to print. The Dark Ages did not happen. Books were burned for a reason. One organization has doubled the actual length of its existence by expanding the real chronology. Read why.
I had always wondered why Christ died about AD33 and yet men waited until the 11th century to form the Knights Templar, the Cathars, etc and go after the Holy Land by force. Why the 1000 year gap? Turns out there wasn't more than a 10-12 year gap and he proves it using astronomy. This also implies that the planet is not as old as we have been told, and current Christian and other creationist scientists are already championing that idea without being aware of Fomenko's book. The two groups, creationist scientists and the Russian mathematical analysts corroborate each other. Fascinating.
Of course, all this flies in the face of what we have been told traditionally is the 'proper' chronology of western civilization, and most readers will experience 'cognitive dissonance' in reading this book. It means that our history going backwards from AD1600 becomes progressively more incorrect and unreliable until it cannot be trusted at all... in the space of 700-800 years.
Naturally, the curious, open-minded reader will want to know WHO did this, WHY, and did any of the events we think of as really ancient ever happen?
Dr. Fomenko is a respected scientist/mathematician at Moscow State University who has already answered these questions to the satisfaction of his initially skeptical colleagues. Most of them are now believers, a few still refuse to believe (the usual diehards), and of course the western press has ignored Fomenko's work -- for obvious reasons when you read the book. The ones who perpetrated this chronology ruse have a lot to answer for. They are still with us. That's why this book is a well-kept secret.
I gave the book a 4-star rating because I was unable to check out some of his claims; those I checked were as he said. But if even 1/3 of his claims are true, this punches a big hole in what we think is our history, the meaning of western civilization, our educational process (for repeating the ruse as gospel), and the trustworthiness of the organization that perpetrated this ruse, well-intentioned or not.
This book relates to current research into a Young Earth paradigm, to John Keel's discoveries about our planet, and Fr Malachi Martin's insights (in his now out-of-print books). We are indeed sheep who are manipulated and kept ignorant -- for a reason. While knowing what these men have to say may be the "booby prize" (as in: 'what can you do with this knowledge?'), it will provide interesting reading. Didn't someone say: "...and the Truth will set you free."?? For you to judge if this book contains the truth.
Provocative, appealing and controversial.......2006-08-02
Fomenko has succeeded to convincingly demonstrate the misconception about what "history" factually is... It is fiction and -like we can read and judge for ourselves- no science. It indeed is "make belief" only. I "discovered" Fomenko while studying the "old" history of Al Andaluz, Spain. Having found too many contradictions in available data, having seen too many forgeries as to pretend the importance of christianity for its decline, I ventured out to find Fomenko, who convinced me that we know little if anything for sure of the epoch before the XI-century. However, the integration of the Arabic-Islamic cultural history into the heavily distorted Western fails... There are some attempts to fit "the budding new religion" (Islam) into Fomenko's scheme, but they are too weak to be taken seriously and too often focussing on Turkey as the region where things started to influence the West, which is untrue at all.
Islam certainly was no "new religion" in the X-century. That the highly cultivated Al Andaluz ruler Mohammed-I could have been "mirrored" down in time into some myth about the "illiterate" founder of Islam itself is highly speculative. Nevertheless, Fomenko convinces me about the processes that were involved in forging a christian history. Intriguing and controversial as his books are, I recommend them as to rethink our current position in time and space and simply verify what was claimed. It is a "good" book, but not for bedtime reading... Mundus vult decipi, the world wants to be cheated. Fomenko's readers will understand why.
pharaohs lived in the 3rd century AD.......2006-02-16
Traces of white wine were found in Tutankhamen's tomb however there were no record of white wine in Egypt until the 3rd century AD, 1600 years after the young pharaoh died according to the traditional chronology. http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg18925395.400
It can be interpreted as a contribution towards New Chronology theory that pharaohs lived in the 3rd century AD.
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Town and Country in Pre-industrial Spain: Cuenca 15401870 (Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time)
David Reher
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
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ASIN: 0521352924 |
Book Description
This is an in-depth study of Cuenca, a hilltop town on the Castilian Meseta, from the middle of the 16th to the end of the 19th centuries. Dr Reher analyzes its socio-economic structures in the context of the urbanization of rural Spain, and shows how the history of the town is paradigmatic of the social, economic and demographic changes in urban areas of the Mediterranean basin.Based on many hitherto unpublished Spanish sources, this book is the first of its kind to come from the Iberian Peninsular. It aims to be relevent to any scholar interested in the general experience of urban development and relations with the countryside in early modern Europe.Specialists in social, economic and democraphic history, historians of Spain, historical geographers will be interested in this book.
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- Europe Got Lucky
- nonsense
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The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy.
Kenneth Pomeranz
Manufacturer: Princeton University Press
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Similar Items:
- ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age
- Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350
- China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience
- The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress
- The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, And the World Economy, 1400 to the Present (Sources and Studies in World History)
ASIN: 0691090106 |
Book Description
The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade.
Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths.
Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia's economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths--paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas.
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The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade. Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths. Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta.
Customer Reviews:
Powerful data and arguments.......2007-04-26
Kenneth Pomeranz's The Great Divergence reinforces some arguments of Frank's ReOrient and reformulates some others. Like Frank, Pomeranz argues that European economy was not unusually different from or superior to the economies of China and Japan until the 19th century. Like Frank, Pomeranz also argues that the critical factors that made possible the rise of Europe were external rather than internal factors. However, unlike Frank who explained the rise of the West in the 19th century through "the fall of Asia" in the previous century, Pomeranz attributes the nineteenth-century divergence between the European economy and the Asian economies to Europe's coal and New World's land that jointly relived the ecological constraints of the nineteenth-century Europeans.
Explaining Pre-Divergence Similarities:
Pomeranz starts his book with comparisons of European and Asian economies in 16th through 18th centuries. A difference in Pomeranz's approach is that he prefers to compare "regions" rather than countries. He argues that such places as Yangzi Delta, The Kanto plain, Britain, the Netherlands, and Gujarat, shared some crucial features with each other, which they did not share with the rest of the world or subcontinent around them. Thus, he prefers to compare these special areas directly rather than within the larger "arbitrary" continental units (p. 8).
Pomeranz first demonstrates that there were no significant differences between England, China, and Japan in terms of average standards of life. Average life expectancy and calorie intake were at comparable levels in all three countries. In the same vein, the European had no superiority to Asians with respect to technology and mining. China was ahead of Europe in physical science, mathematics, and maternal and infant health. Europe's irrigation technology also lagged behind China, India, and Japan. Even as late as first half of the 19th century, Indian iron was reported to be superior to English iron (pp. 44-6). If Europe had any real technological edge in the 18th century, it was not in tools or machines, but in "instruments" such as clocks, watches, telescopes, and eyeglasses (p. 67).
Pomeranz then tries to show that differences in terms of labor and land markets in Europe and China in 16th through 18th centuries were significant and did not always favor Europe so that they would be a viable explanation for the later divergence. Indeed, overall China was closer to market economy than was most of Europe, including most of "western" Europe. Much of Western Europe's farmland was harder to buy and sell than that of China. In Yangzi Valley, for example, close to half of land was rented (p. 72-3). This was also similar in labor market. Labor was not less free in China than in Europe (pp. 80-1). Thus, Pomeranz concludes that Europe's factor markets for land and labor "seem no closer to Smithian ideas of freedom and efficiency than do those of China, and perhaps a good deal less so," (p. 107).
Part II of The Great Divergence deals with the less-analyzed issue of consumption. Pomeranz takes issue with Sombart and some others' argument that Europe a produced a unique "consumer society" that provided a demand base for industrial revolution. Pomeranz challenges the "consumer society" argument on two grounds. On the one side, he demonstrates that the rise in the European consumption of such luxury goods as tea, sugar, and tobacco was very incremental until the 19th century. He therefore asserts that imagining an irreversible "birth of a consumer society" before 1850 may be seriously misleading (p. 119). On the other side, he demonstrates that consumption of these everyday luxury goods were at comparable levels in China and Japan. The consumption of durable luxuries (furniture, pictures, china, books, jewelry, etc.) was not significantly different in these three regions either (pp. 130-1). Thus, Europe did not have any type of "consumer society" advantage vis-à-vis China and Japan that would give her a head start in the competition to rise. I should also note that European figures as to consumption of luxury goods refute the arguments on "European" miracle as well. Pomeranz demonstrates that, if anything, it was a British, and to lesser extent Dutch, revolution and not a European one until 1850 (pp. 119).
To sum up the first part, Pomeranz demonstrates that Europe was not exceptionally different from China or Japan in terms of production, market regulation, or the consumption of luxury goods. Given this similarity of internal factors, Pomeranz turns to external linkages to explain the nineteenth-century divergence.
Explaining the Divergence:
A weakness in Andre Gunder Frank's book was that he could not adequately account for the "rise of the West" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Frank's argument was that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that "the fall of Asia" preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (ReOrient, pp. 266-8). Pomeranz finds this argument impressionistic and discards it on the grounds that population growth and ecological effects that were argued to make China "fall" were present in Europe as well. Thus, he asserts, "if Europe was not yet in crisis, then in all likelihood China was not either," (p. 12).
Pomeranz argues that the primary problem that both European and Asian nations were facing by 18th century were the ecological constraints that resulted from increasing population and scarce land. Therefore, the real and long-lasting solution would necessitate land-saving innovations rather than labor-saving ones.
As such, industrial revolution was a cause of later European rise than result of previous European exceptionality.
A Conclusion:
When compared with Frank's ReOrient, Pomeranz's The Great Divergence is more robust and convincing in two respects. First, it does not have a "Sinocentrism" bias and argues that the pre-1800 world was "a polycentric world with no dominant center," (p. 4). Second, it tries to explain the rise of Europe in the 19th century with substantive factors rather than mysterious Kondratieff cycles. In that respect, The Great Divergence is a nice remedy to the gaps and problems in ReOrient. However, I think that Pomeranz's downplaying the importance of profits that European made through colonialism is misleading. In evaluating the role of colonial profit-extraction in Europe's rise, one should take into account its impact on the continuation and spread of industrial revolution as well as on industrial revolution itself. Even if the spark of the industrial revolution could be lighted without the profits made in the New World, the fire of industrial revolution would not have survived a couple decades if it were not for the colonial resources and markets.
povocative and meticulously researched!.......2006-05-25
The strengths: Very provocative, aiming straight at conventional wisdom, be it euro-centric or world-system ones. Solid research behind the comparative study of Europe, China, and to a lesser extend, Japan. Pomeranz gives out hard evidence in life-expectacy, birth rates, market condition, ecological stress etc., hightlighting striking similarites between these socities in the 18th century.
Some readers may have problem with his conclusion that industrialization went ahead only because Europe got lucky in the convenient location of coal and the readily available resourses of the new world. However, just because these are paramount factors does not mean that they are all it needed. Put another way, had China got the same good fortune, it does not necessarily follow that China would industrilize, nor has Pomeranz argued this way.
Weaknesses: The writing is BAD, very convoluted. However, the most important failure is that Pomeranz treats these societies as though they were static. He failed to take into consideration their difference in the RATE of change. The fact that Europe was playing a catch up to Asia through-out the middle ages, and achieved par in pre-modern time, had to imply a quicker pulse. Europe's gradual opening of the mind (reformation ,renaissance), was roughly concurrent with China's gradual closing (the advent of neo-confucianism, ossification of the civil examination system). It's hard to believe that this change of fortune had no long-lasting impact on the underlying dynamics of the societes. Culture does matter, it's just been given a bad name by the likes of Huntington and Landes:)
Europe Got Lucky.......2006-02-13
Pomeranz advances the thesis that Europe's rise to world power (instead of a potentially similar but not historically realized rise by China, Japan, or India) was not caused by any internal social advantage possessed by western Europe-at least not principally caused. Pomeranz uses extensive research to demonstrate that western Europe, China, and Japan were not fundamentally different societies at the beginning of the modern era. The author maintains that Europe had the good fortune of having the land and mineral resources of the New World available at the right time, along with the conveniently-located coal resources of England; and it is this collection of fortuitous advantages that enabled Europe to propel itself into industrial revolution and world power.
The premise of the book is promising. The meat of the book can be a bit difficult to chew. The author compares the human, energy, land, and other resources of Europe and China in great detail to make his case. The sheer volume of facts and figures can make the going slow. Still, it's worth reading all of what the author has to say.
Overall, the argument is compelling. All three societies (western Europe, China, and Japan) were faced with populations that had more-or-less come in line with the carrying capacities of their lands based on the level of technology of the day. Additional agricultural productivity could only have come with additional inputs of labor into the existing stock of land. This is essentially what happened in China. Western Europe, led by England, went the way of labor-saving techniques and technologies that would not have been practicable without access to the additional agricultural potential and mineral wealth of the New World. Other factors, such as financial institutions and internal competition fade in importance before the simple math of carrying capacity.
The Great Divergence is quality reading. One does not have to agree with everything contained in the book to absorb the basic point: Europe got lucky. Be prepared to wade through an appropriately generous supply of facts and figures to back Pomeranz's claim.
nonsense.......2005-12-05
In "The Great Divergence", Kenneth Pomeranz presents an exhaustive investigation of the minutest differences and similarities in development of China and Western Europe. His claim, and stated objective, is to show that Europe's emergence as a preeminent power was the result of privileged access to overseas colonies, exploitation of non-Europeans, and a fortunate `geographic accident' of the location of coal in England. However, considering China's significant, and much earlier, developments in science, technology, and shipping, not to mention their huge deposits of coal, and its use some 600 years before the Europeans to make iron, it's difficult to understand Pomeranz's rationalization of those claims and ultimately the whole point of his book.
His specialty and interests clearly lie in China. In this book he attempts to shed a somewhat biased benevolent light on China by explaining the violent circumstances that led to the industrial revolution in Europe, and why it didn't happen in China. He presents a comparative analysis in such close, tortuous, detail that he becomes myopic in drawing his conclusions. His joy and skill clearly lie in analysis, rather than synthesis, and in the process, and among the ensuing debris, he loses a view of the whole as processes of nation building rather than competing sets of historical data. The outcome notwithstanding, he consistently paints each step in the process of growth in Europe and its colonies as a violent and ugly stepsister to a more sophisticated, benign version taking place in China. All of which may be true, but he discounts the effects of institutions, capital markets, capital accumulation, and regulatory competition in Europe as having marginal effect on the difference in outcome between the two areas because in his opinion what was happening in Europe was so similar to what was going on in China. He states that "European science, technology, and philosophical inclinations alone do not seem an adequate explanation, and alleged differences in economic institutions seem largely irrelevant".
Regulatory competition in Europe, for Pomeranz, equates to military competition. Although it could be argued from a more objective perspective that military research and development regularly spins off technological advances applicable in commercial areas, Pomeranz claims that in Europe `the net effect of warfare on technological innovation is likely to have been negative'. Clearly not true, but his argument about it possibly killing off other inventors was kind of funny. The development of institutions and property rights arising from this competition for him equals only the purchases of position, interference of guild control, and the granting monopoly privileges. He claims that all served to keep prices high, limit the extent of markets, and restrict output. The most positive function of `military' competition seen by Pomeranz is in the overseas projection of power. This lies in contrast to his claim that China was engaged in competitive trade with low margins, unprivileged by the state, that couldn't generate enough profits to finance a European style military capitalism. Here he ignores the Chinese obsession with intensive land use to feed its armies. The vast differences between the European states and the diversity of politics, social constructs, and institutions therein will show that had any single one of them been dominant the story of Europe, and the world, would have been very much different. Had the Chinese the benefit of this fracture, the voyages of Zheng He would have been continued, but when he died, the Confucians were regaining power and There was no political or spiritual will to continue. They felt that other nations had nothing to offer the already prosperous Chinese and they had no need to conquer their souls. Their voyages were ended, their fleets were dismantled and they turned inward. It became a crime to set sail from China in a multi-masted ship. This was their choice. One nation, one choice. Had there been competition among states in China, someone, somewhere would have chosen to continue.
As far as ethical systems and ideology are concerned, Pomeranz doesn't consider the consequences of differing motivation but only writes that philosophical inclinations do not seem an adequate explanation of divergent paths. Lost in analysis of the details of the similarities, here he misses the significance of the differences. Arguing that they were too small to create the large disparities in outcomes, he fails to ask whether those differences were what led to different choices. The differences in the ethical systems of Christian Western Europe and Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist China are enormous. The differences in the choices made within the context of those systems, especially within the protestant reformation and the creation of the Church of England, are significant. Pomeranz claims that ideology, or `philosophical inclinations', can't explain the different outcomes in the fortunes of China and Europe, but it was ideology and philosophy that led to the divergence in their development paths. Western Europe's history of fighting Muslims to keep them at bay and out of Europe established their crusading zeal to protect themselves by trying to convert everyone they could find. They embodied this fear and hegemonic drive and made Christian solipsism an imperative part of their culture. Vasco Da Gama said that the objectives of his voyages were "Christians and Spices". This dogmatic drive of the Europeans and their churches' implicit consent of their conquests and colonialism lent a higher power to their expansion. The Chinese chose not to continue their voyages. The Europeans were on a mission from God.
In this book, great tenaciousness in presenting historical data meets an astounding lack of insight into behavior and economics, and leaves the reader (at least me anyway) wondering why it was written in the first place.
Somewhat Innovative, Hard to Read.......2005-11-24
This book does a good job of criticizing many Anglo-centric explanations of why Europeans industrialized first by providing detailed evidence that the area near the Yangzi river delta was mostly as advanced as England when England started the industrial revolution.
It does a less convincing job of arguing that coal and new world land were the main reasons for England's success. I'm tempted to believe that American sugar provided desperately needed calories to break out of a Malthusian trap, but the evidence doesn't show that became significant until the industrial revolution had already started.
Conveniently located coal undoubtedly gave England a boost, but not a big enough boost that there is a practical way to decide it was more important than the numerous cultural differences which might have given England the edge it needed.
The book makes a serious effort to dismiss those cultural explanations, but is not thorough enough. In particular, I'm disappointed with the cryptic way that it dismisses the relevance of the ideas in Helmut Schoeck's book Envy.
The style is often deadening, with lengthy descriptions of details whose relevance is unobvious.
Average customer rating:
- Good information
- A Well-Made Case
- Challenge - not propaganda.
- Lying with numbers.
- Don't Cut the Pie, Bake Another One
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Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Reality
Olaf Gersemann
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ASIN: 1930865627 |
Book Description
Europeans and many American pundits believe that while the U.S. economy may create more growth, Europeans have it better when it come to job security and other factors. Olaf Gersemann, a German reporter who came to America, found the reality quite different. He checked facts and found the market freedoms in America create a more flexible, adaptable and prosperous system then the declining welfare states of old Europe.
Customer Reviews:
Good information.......2007-05-27
Most literature showing the greatness of capitalism through statistics is horribly biased, but this book keeps the bias to a moderate level. This means you get a wealth of statistical information that is not overly influenced by ideology, which is a rare find.
A Well-Made Case.......2007-05-01
Like the previous reviewer, I think Olaf Gersemann offers a balanced and well-documented case that France, Germany, and Italy would benefit from some American-style economic liberalization. Advancing an argument with logic and solid empirical evidence is not the same thing as writing propaganda.
Gersemann goes out of his way to point to that it is "foolish" to believe that post-war European economic models are "generally, under all imaginable circumstances, inferior to other economic models." He draws attention to the number of Americans without health insurance, the sorry state of many of our public schools, the alarmingly high rate of poverty among American unwed mothers and their children, and the "ridiculously high" compensation of many corporate managers. This book is not a one-sided apologia.
But it does, as advertised, manage to dispel many myths about American capitalism and the supposedly kinder, more agreeable European version.
As have a number of others before him, Gersemann reveals the hollowness of the claim that the purchasing power of working-class people in the U.S. has been stagnant since the early 1970s. And he does this using household income numbers as his primary statistical evidence, even though he could have shown even more improvement (as he briefly points out) if he had used the *per capita* money income of the average household. (Household income has been depressed because there are now fewer people per house, which is a sign both of more widespread home ownership, and thus more wealth, as well as a sign of higher rates of illegitimacy.) If further adjustments are made to control for immigrants--whose pre-immigration incomes do not, obviously, show up in U.S. statistics--it becomes even more evident that the American economy is much more successful at improving the of lot native-born workers in the bottom quintile than one would gather from watching ABC News or reading *The New York Times*. That our economy also improves the lives of immigrants, and in the process makes the gains of the native-born less statistically obvious, is cause for congratulations, not criticism. The improvement in the lives of particular individuals is what matters, not the fate of a particular quintile, the composition of which is ever-changing.
Gersemann also rebuts much of the nonsense reported about the percentage of Americans who are "trapped" in poverty and about low unemployment merely being the result of mind-numbing service jobs that don't pay a living wage. He demonstrates that those on the left who praise the security offered by the European system too often fail to note that security comes at the price of dynamism, which comes at the price of opportunity, especially for those on the bottom.
Unfortunately, the same neighborhoods in France that suffer most from this lack of opportunity, and from debilitating unemployment, voted overwhelmingly for the Socialist candidate (Ms. Royal) in last week's elections, even though it is not she but the much hated Mr. Sarkozy who stands at least some chance of offering them economic opportunities infinitely more lucrative than burning cars. And of course it was the French left that took to the streets when the government attempted to enact modest reforms to make the labor market more flexible. Marching for "social justice" and against "American conditions" also meant marching for the continued joblessness of North African immigrants. But what of it? It's all too easy to ignore arguments like Gersemann's, congratulate oneself on being morally superior to capitalists, and then take a nice long vacation.
Both Europeans and Americans would benefit from reading this book. It's not a groundbreaking work of research, and in fact most of the information Gersemann presents can be gleaned from the financial press. But the book doesn't pretend to be groundbreaking. What makes it a success is that it so clearly and dispassionately debunks many of the most frequently repeated falsehoods about the American and European economies.
Challenge - not propaganda........2007-04-20
It is surprising that "Cowboy Capitalism", recommended by two nobel laureates (the late Friedman and Buchanan), would be accused of propaganda by a critical voice (Newton Ooi, below) who first proceeded to point out that all the facts it presents are true. "Cowboy Capitlism" has an agenda, of course - an agenda to show through the raw numbers that European (or NYTimes readers') perceptions of the two economic systems of central Europe and the US are skewed... that there is more to the differences and the benefits/detriments that each system offers, than is popularily acknowledged. Fear and suspicions (and lack of knowledge) are the cause of this - rather than facts. This book pokes fun at the former by trying to reveal the latter.
In doing so, CC is actually rather fair. It does not pretend that the European economic system is per se inferior to the US System. In fact, there were times in which it was rather superior. (Times of great economic stability had Germany, for example, grow its economy at a pace well above that of the US. Or healthcare - where Europe admittedly piggy-bag rides on US consumers' expenses, but which Gersemann has no probolem stating is a matter of preference, not "better" or "worse".)
Anyway... to look at the criticism listed below:
Home Ownership: The argument that because of higher population density, home ownership would *naturally* be less ("less land to build on") is completely ludicrous. What would follow that argument would be mass-homelessness, not low ownership rates. People in Europe still live in places... the question is: why don't they own? Apartments count, too, you know! (Density contributes to homes being more affordable - which is one of the reasons. Red tape making ownership more difficult is another. Rent-protection is yet another. (And when looking at entire countries, the numbers *are* meaningful. The author did not compare only New York to rural Europe.)
Education: I'm European, so I don't want to argue the point that by going to high school I am automatically smarter than a US college graduate... even though I had to learn that knowing where Malaysa and Phoenix are (I've 'always' known), somehow don't give me the edge on the job-market that I thought it would. :-( There are Americans who audaciously compete with me, despite flagrant lack of geographical knowledge... And win out! Perhaps other factors matter, too? Drats.
Unemployment rates are not measured by whether one "has to work" or not. Unemployment rates are measured by how many people *want* to work and can't. A busy little Hausfrau who takes care of the kids and whose husband makes enough to support the entire family doesn't show up in the unemployment numbers, because she probably doesn't run out and declare herself unemployed. So the higher numbers of unemployment of women in Europe reflect women who "have to work" -- but won't find a job. And that's the real problem... whether one likes the social ramnification and the dissolution of the family nucleus or not.
Computer use, Internet access et al. in Germany is well behind that of the US. Especially among the crowd that didn't grow up with them.
Computers, even made from recycled materials or made with the use of recycled parts (I've done that, years ago, but I wonder how common that still is) would still show up as a computer sold... They don't sit around trash-heaps and maker their own computers out of trash, after all.
The last point - oil-war-obesety-pharma-industry - is a little too dense fore me to get into. I am baffled.
Cowboy Capitalism does not pretend not to take sides. But it wants to show that it takes the side of greater economic freedom, because there are benefits to more people to be had - at the price of less security for others. (That's obviously a gross oversimplification... but aims in the right direction, I should believe.) The way this book does it is humorous (in a dry way) and merciless... but not with blindfolds or immune to "inconvenient" facts. This is a must-read for when your European friends come over to visit and try to tell you why everything is so much better in the old part of the world. (30% youth unemployment in France, a terribly efficient but very rigid economy, are just one of many points to consider...)
P.S. The Thinktank CATO is a libertarian institution, not a conservative one. The two overlap on many issues, but are not the same. (Legalization of drugs, Gay marriage et al. are points libertarians support; conservatives by-and-large don't.)
Lying with numbers........2007-03-04
The title of this book, Cowboy Capitalism, is a term many Europeans use to describe the American business climate. More precisely, the American style of economics involves a lot of uncertainty and risk, with high chances of success (Microsoft and Google) and failure (Enron and GM) and the ensuing results of low job security, high income fluctuations, and high rates of bankruptcies for businesses and individuals. This book argues that this has produced an overall better standard of living in the US than in the countries of Germany, France and Italy. This book is published by the Cato Institute, a conservative US organization that lobbies for deregulation of public enterprises, free market reforms and low taxes. The book argues its points by presenting a lot of statistical data comparing the employment rates, home ownership rates, educational levels, disposable income levels, and other macro and micro economic indicators of the US, France, Italy and Germany. I do not doubt the validity of the numbers presented, but they only show part of the story. Lets go over them one by one.
First, this book gives numbers showing that home ownership is higher in the US than in France, Italy and Germany. This is absolutely true. The author attributes this difference to the fact that since America is more free-market, incomes are generally higher in America, and hence more people can afford to own homes. The author totally misses the affect of population density. The population density of the three European countries listed are substantially higher than in the US, meaning there is less land per person. This means there is less land to build homes on, so of course fewer people can own homes. If one looks back over the past 30 years; the primary engine for economic growth in the US is new home construction. Besides, the use of home ownership as a measure of prosperity is totally bogus. New Yorkers have lower home ownership rates than residents of most southern cities, yet New Yorkers in general are wealthier than people living in the deep South.
Second, the book states that a higher percentage of people in America go to college than in France, Germany and Italy. Again, absolutely true. What the author misses is the amount of knowledge learned K-12. Specifically, many European high school graduates are better educated than many American college graduates. For instance, just about every European has taken a year of calculus before leaving high school. There are many American college graduates who have never taken a semester of calculus! If you don't believe me, ask yourself why College Algebra classes are so common on college campuses. Here is another example. After I received my bachelor's degree, I backpacked through Europe and stayed at youth hostels. Every local I met knew where Malaysia (my birth country) and Phoenix, Arizona (my hometown) was on the globe. Coming back home, most of my American friends could not locate the places I visited such as Berlin, Rome, London, Munich, etc... Another example, every French, German and Italian I met in Europe could speak English to some degree. How many native-born Americans can speak a second language? Getting an education is about acquiring a bank of knowledge and set of skills. I dare say most citizens of Italy, France and Germany acquire more knowledge and skills K-12 than most native-born Americans acquire K-college. Given this statement, the higher rates of college participation in the US do not amount to much.
Third, the book states that employment rates are higher in the US than in France, Germany and Italy; especially among women. This is true. What the author does not mention is that many Americans, especially women, work because they have to. Specifically, a larger percentage of American adults are single or divorced than in Europe. And the percentage of single American women raising children is higher than in Europe. Growing up in America, half my friends had working mothers. The most common reasons why was that either their fathers walked out on them, or their parents were divorced. So of course their mothers had to work; they could not rely on the fathers to bring home the bacon. This brings up another unspoken truth. A divorced couple requires twice as many places to live as a married couple; i.e. two houses versus one house. This means that two divorced parents will have to spend more money than two married parents. The more money that is spent means the faster the economy moves, so of course the US economy will grow faster than the European economy.
Fourth, the author states that the use of high-tech products in France, Italy and Germany is lower than in America. He argues this point by stating that the number of units of high-tech items sold in the US is higher per capita than in the 3 European countries, and that these industries employ more people in the US than in the 3 European countries. True again. Again the author leaves out many qualifying factors. For example, Germany has strict recycling and reuse laws for computers. Specifically, when a German throws away her old computer, it does not end up in a landfill occupying space and leaking various chemicals into the environment. Instead, it is taken apart piece by piece. Those parts that can be re-used, like the fans, housing and cables, are packaged with new computers, while those that cannot are recycled. In this way, less is wasted. A side effect is that since more stuff gets reused, there is less need to produce, hence a smaller industry geared around the production of computers in Germany. Does that mean Germans are less computer literate than Americans? I doubt it. I do not remember seeing in this book a chart comparing computer literacy in Germany versus the US.
Fifth, this book compares the state of the pharmaceutical industry in the US versus his three target European countries. The book shows that this industry is more profitable, generates more new drugs, employs more people, and pays better in the US than in Europe. This is all true. But what the author forgets is that demand for pharmaceutical drugs is less in Europe than in the US. As any person who has lived in both Europe and America can tell you, Americans are more obese and out of shape than Europeans. Higher obesity rates leads to higher rates of cancer, heart disease, stroke, diabetes and a whole host of other chronic diseases. This in turn leads to a higher demand for pharmaceutical drugs to treat them, which in turn leads to a bigger and more profitable pharmaceutical industry in the US than in Europe. Why are Americans more obese than in Europe? That leads to my last point, so keep reading.
Last, this book totally misses a point that is very telling in comparing the economies of the US, Germany, France and Italy, and that is energy consumption. Per person, Americans consume more BTUs of energy from fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal than Europeans. Energy is the blood of economic growth. Since the end of WWII, America has pursued a policy of acquiring and using fossil fuels in increasing amounts with time. On the other hand, Europe has pursued a dual policy of reduced energy use and increased energy independence. The former includes cities built to encourage walking and biking, and high taxes on fossil fuels such as car gasoline. The latter includes nuclear reactors in France, and a high reliance on solar and wind power in Germany. These policies are primarily due to WWII. First, the effects of the war left these countries in no shape to pursue aggressive foreign policies of defending oil wells. Second, many Europeans are aware that the causes of WWII included competition for fossil fuels. On the other hand, America was not devastated by WWII, but strengthened. Hence, America's economic growth has mirrored a growth in its fossil fuel industries. Is this a good thing? Once you consider global warming, pollution, destruction of land due to mineral extraction, and other factors, I think the grade goes to Europe for being more energy efficient; even if it means a slower economy and lower employment rates. As a side effect, Europeans drive less than Americans, but walk and bike more, and hence are generally healthier.
In conclusion, the facts stated by this book are all true, but the conclusions they point to are not. Many of the points must be placed in context with other qualifying factors. Overall, this is an OK book that must be read for what it is, propaganda, and not an economic treatise or case study.
Don't Cut the Pie, Bake Another One.......2007-02-15
This book explains that the European model of allocation assumes that the economy is static and employment can increase only by sharing existing jobs with regulation of hours and guaranteed employment. The US model is dynamic and companies that don't perform are replaced through the process of creative destruction by companies that do. Excess resources get reallocated to new enterprises to the benefit of everyone.
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The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (Studies in Social Discontinuity)
Immanuel Wallerstein
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- The Modern World-System III (Studies in Social Discontinuity)
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ASIN: 0127859241 |
Book Description
This book covers the consolidation of the European world-economy during the seventeenth century.
Customer Reviews:
Monumental.......2005-07-20
The central idea in this monumentally documented (220 pages of references for 200 pages of text) study is that a 'Cumulative self-sustaining change in the form of endless search for accumulation has been the leitmotiv of the capitalist world-economy since its genesis in the 16th century.'
The 17th century history was determined by the struggle for the surplus-value between states and classes.
States tried to concentrate all the major sources of capitalist profits within their frontiers in order to become the centre (core) state: cereals, textile, metallurgical products, transport infrastructure, entrepots of the Atlantic trade.
The core country tried to use other countries as conveyors (semi-peripheries) of the created surplus-value in the peripheries.
Within the emerging core state, classes battled among themselves for a major part of this surplus-value.
In the beginning of the 17th century, Holland (the Seventeen Provinces) became the centre of the European economy, which dominated the world.
Its position was first attacked by the Navigation Act (1651). It was ultimately replaced by England, which had defeated France (Treaty of Paris -1763).
The 17th century saw the emergence of a new class: the bourgeoisie. In England, an eventual power struggle for the surplus-value between the bourgeoisie and the landowner aristocrats was avoided through a political compromise. More, the king lost his power to the Parliament, which was controlled by the capitalist classes. Merchants, financiers and landowner aristocrats could work together for the exploitation of the world economy.
The 17th century saw also the emergence of proto-industrialization: many small producers engaged in cottage industry and rural wage work.
I believe that this extremely solidly underpinned study has a major flaw: 'the endless search for accumulation' is not an end, but a means. As Robert Kuttner said: 'Wealth is power.' Power means a bigger chance to survive (as a state, a union, a unit or an individual) in the struggle for life.
Power is not only a question of social\economic systems, but also a matter of political, military or technological strenght.
Why did Britain conquer the waves? Politically, the capitalists controlled the Parliament and could implement their policies. Militarilly, the Navy's strenght assured victory in wars and permitted access to markets or a blocking of the entry of raw materials directly into enemy states. Socially, there was a compromise between the powerful classes. Technologically, the proto-industrialization would cumulate into the Industrial Revolution, which assured Britain's core status for a long time to come.
This book contains a wealth of information and is thought-provoking, but somewhat one-sided.
Highly recommended.
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Social Democratic Party Policies in Contemporary Europe (Routledge/Ecpr Studiesin European Political Science)
G. Bonoli
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ASIN: 0415304253 |
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This comparative volume provides an analysis of Social Democratic governments, examining the policies they have adopted and assessing the extent of similarity and convergence in policy-making among the different countries. The book includes case studies on France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Austria and the UK.
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Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory (Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
Cormac O'Grada
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- The Great Hunger: Ireland: 1845-1849
- The Famine Ships: The Irish Exodus to America
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ASIN: 0691070156 |
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The Irish famine of 1847 and 1848, when harvests failed and more than 3 million Irish died or were forced to emigrate, is one of the signal events of Irish history. The famine that devastated the country, notes Cormac Ó Gráda, professor of economics at University College, Dublin, was exceptional in its severity. "The cost in deaths of many highly publicized Third World famines in the recent past is modest by comparison," he writes, adding that real comparisons come only on the scale of China's catastrophic Great Leap Forward famine of 1959 to 1962 (when, Walter Becker alleges in Hungry Ghosts, 30 million Chinese died). The reason the Irish famine struck so hard, " Gráda argues, is that the Irish food supply was already tenuous; dispossessed from their land and made to rely on a single crop, the potato, the tenant agriculturists of Ireland simply had no resources or stores on which to fall back.
Important though the famine was to Ireland's history, Gráda notes, historians began to study it closely only in the last decade; in that time, dozens of books and monographs have been issued, amplifying a hitherto sparse literature. His scholarly book, heavily documented and full of statistics drawn from censuses and other demographic surveys, is itself a major contribution to historical writing on the subject. --Gregory McNamee
Book Description
Here Ireland's premier economic historian and one of the leading authorities on the Great Irish Famine examines the most lethal natural disaster to strike Europe in the nineteenth century. Between the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the food source that we still call the Irish potato had allowed the fastest population growth in the whole of Western Europe. As vividly described in Ó'Gráda's new work, the advent of the blight phytophthora infestans transformed the potato from an emblem of utility to a symbol of death by starvation. The Irish famine peaked in Black '47, but it brought misery and increased mortality to Ireland for several years.
Central to Irish and British history, European demography, the world history of famines, and the story of American immigration, the Great Irish Famine is presented here from a variety of new perspectives. Moving away from the traditional narrative historical approach to the catastrophe, Ó'Gráda concentrates instead on fresh insights available through interdisciplinary and comparative methods. He highlights several economic and sociological features of the famine previously neglected in the literature, such as the part played by traders and markets, by medical science, and by migration. Other topics include how the Irish climate, usually hospitable to the potato, exacerbated the failure of the crops in 1845-1847, and the controversial issue of Britain's failure to provide adequate relief to the dying Irish.
Ó'Gráda also examines the impact on urban Dublin of what was mainly a rural disaster and offers a critical analysis of the famine as represented in folk memory and tradition.
The broad scope of this book is matched by its remarkable range of sources, published and archival. The book will be the starting point for all future research into the Irish famine.
Customer Reviews:
Essential but not easy or pleasant reading........2001-02-19
Both the tragic subject and the density of documentation, with graphs and statistics, make this a hard book to read. The Famine killed over a million people, even on the most conservative estimates. It virtually wiped out the Gaeltacht. The question that resonates today is whether fewer people would have died if Ireland in 1840 had been an independent country, with its boundaries at the salt water. You'd have to read this book at least, and maybe some others as well, to get an answer to that question.
An leabhar is fearr ar an drochshaol - riamh!.......1999-05-14
This is a fraught subject, but O Grada handles it with both rigour and compassion.
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Drawing from the work of internationally renowned scholars from the Research Network on Gender, Politics and the State (RNGS), this study offers in-depth analysis of the relationship between state feminism, women's movements and public policy and places them within a comparative theoretical framework. Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Austria, Belgium, Canada, and the U.S. are all discussed individually.
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